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Introduction
The Polluter-Pays Principle (PPP) is the oldest, most durable, and argua-
bly the most important doctrine bridging environmental and trade poli-
cies. It was first proposed in 1971 by the Commission on International
Trade and Investment Policy, although not by name: "The Commission
strongly recommends that the United States actively seek international
adoption of the principle that pollution abatement be financed, so far as
practical, by methods which assure that the costs of control are reflected
in the prices of the goods produced."1 The PPP was adopted by the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in
19722 and further clarified in the Council's 1974 recommendation on its
implementation.3 The PPP became European Community (EC) (now
* Director and Professor, International Economics Department, The Paul H.
Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University.
1. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICY, UNITED STATES
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD 134-35 (1971) [herein-
after WILLIAMS COMMISSION REPORT]. See also Charles Pearson & Wendy Takacs, Interna-
tional Economic Implications of Environmental Control and Pollution Abatement Programs, in
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD - PAPERS
(Commission on International Trade and Investment Policy ed., 1971).
2. Recommendation of the Council on Guiding Principles Concerning International Eco-
nomic Aspects of Environmental Policies, Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development [OECD] Doc. C(72)128 (May 26, 1972) [hereinafter Guiding Pinciplek],
reprinted in THE POLLUrER PAYS PRINCIPLE: DEFINITION, ANALYSIS, IMPLEMENTATION 11
(OECD ed., 1975) [hereinafter THE PoLLUrER PAYS PRINCIPLE].
3. Recommendation of the Council on the Implementation of the Polluter-Pays Pinciple,
OECD Doc. C(74)223 (Nov. 14, 1974) [hereinafter Implementation Recommendation],
reprinted in THE POLLUTER PAYS PRIcNIL, supra note 2, at 18.
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European Union) policy in 1975 with a Council recommendation con-
cerning environmental cost allocation.4 The 1987 Single European Act
amended the original Treaty of Rome and provides a legal basis for EC
environmental policy.5 The Act adopts the PPP, as well as the "sub-
sidiarity" and the "precautionary" principles.
6
The Polluter-Pays Principle is not, however, explicit in the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 7 (GATT), the GATT Subsidies Code,8 or
the recently concluded Uruguay Round Agreement.9 In view of the PPP's
central position in the trade-environment policy literature, the current
interest in "greening" the GATT, and the remarkable, resurgent interest in
the trade-environment policy nexus generally, it is useful to reexamine the
PPP, analyze the extent to which the PPP and the GATT are mutually con-
sistent, and consider whether and how the PPP might be brought more
formally within the GATr framework.
At first glance this would appear to be a straightforward exercise. In
practice it is not. Although durable and widely referenced, the PPP is not
without its ambiguities and idiosyncratic interpretations. This is partly due
to confusion arising from the term itself. The words connote an appropri-
ate incidence of pollution costs-which is a distribution or equity ques-
tion-but the origin of the PPP is as an efficiency principle. Moreover,
from the start, both the OECD and the EC have contemplated and prac-
ticed exceptions to the PPP. Indeed, the basic meaning attached to the
PPP appears to be changing. Finally, GATT language and practice as they
relate to issues raised by the PPP are less than crystal clear.
Part I of this article sorts out various interpretations and issues associ-
ated with the PPP. Part II presents a brief review of the PPP in practice,
including the consensus on legitimate exceptions to the PPP. Part III con-
siders the congruence of the PPP and the GAT, while Part IV offers a
summary and conclusions.
I. Interpretations of the PPP
In reviewing OECD and EC documentation of the PPP, the recommenda-
tion of the Williams Commission, and the background study on which the
4. Council Recommendation of 3 March 1975 Regarding Cost Allocation and
Action by Public Authorities on Environmental Matters, 1975 OJ. (L 194) 1 [hereinaf-
ter Cost Allocation Recommendation].
5. Single European Act, 1987 OJ. (L169) 1, art. 25.
6. Id.
7. General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 188, reprinted in GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECrED Docu.
MENTS, 4th Supp. 1 (1969) [hereinafter GATT].
8. Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, & XXIII of
the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 513, 1186
U.N.T.S. 204 [hereinafter The Subsidies Code].
9. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions, GATT Doc. MTN/FA (Dec. 15, 1993) [hereinafter Uruguay Round], 33 I.L.M. 9
(1994), reprinted in OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATwE, FINAL Acr EMBODYING
THE RESULTs OF THE URUGUAY RouND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (VERSION
OF 15 DECEMBER 1993) (1993).
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Commission's recommendation was based, it is quite clear that the origi-
nal, central meaning attached to the PPP was that of a cost-allocation prin-
ciple for efficiency objectives. Specifically, the costs of pollution
abatement activities undertaken in the private sector should be borne by
the private sector and not offset by government grants and subsidies. The
OECD's Guiding Principles are quite explicit on this point: "The [Pol-
luter-Pays] Principle means that the polluter should bear the expenses of
carrying out the above mentioned [public measures to reduce pollution]
decided by public authorities.... Such measures should not be accompa-
nied by subsidies that would create significant distortions in international
trade and investment."10 Still, as discussed below, the OECD was not
unmindful of equity implications."
The EC is equally clear, calling on those responsible for pollution to
pay for abatement and stating that "environmental protection should not
in principle depend on policies which rely on grants of aid and place the
burden of combating pollution on the Community."12 The principal
motivation was efficiency, not equity or fairness. The EC did, however,
state that the PPP meets the criterion of equitable practice.' 3 Both the
OECD and the EC recognized that by allocating abatement costs to the
private sector, market prices would more closely reflect the social costs of
production. This would tend to encourage pollution abatement by reduc-
ing consumption of pollution-intensive products. International adoption
of the PPP would avoid distortions to international trade and investment
arising from differential pollution abatement financing methods. Thus,
the PPP supports improved efficiency in the allocation of natural and envi-
ronmental resources-it helps correct externality-distorted product prices.
At the same time, it helps prevent a trade distortion arising from differen-
tial financing mechanisms.
If the PPP was clearly a cost allocation principle' in origin, where are
the ambiguities?
A. Who Pays?
Virtually all analysts of the PPP agree that the costs of pollution abatement
incurred by polluting firms in the private sector may be passed on to con-
sumers in the price of goods and services. The PPP did not slip into the
trap of saying that the cost of abatement measures be included in the price
of goods, but rather that they be included in the costs of production, leav-
ing open the question of whether the costs are passed forward to consum-
ers.1 4 Depending on market structure (i.e., whether the market is fiercely
10. Guiding Pindples, supra note 2, annex, 1 4, reprinted in THE PoLLtrrER PAYS PRIN-
ciPLE, supra note 2, at 12-13. Note that the wording leaves open the possibility of subsi-
dies that do not create significant distortions to trade.
11. See infra part I.E.
12. Cost Allocation Recommendation, supra note 4, annex, 1 2.
13. See id. 11.
14. "From the point of view of conformity with the Polluter-Pays Principle, it does
not matter whether the polluter passes on to his prices some or all the environmental
costs or absorbs them." Note on the Implementation of the Polluter-Pays Prindple, OECD
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competitive, oligopolistic, or monopolistic) and the price elasticity of
demand, all, some, or none of pollution abatement costs may be passed on
to consumers in prices, and all, some, or none may be absorbed by
reduced profits and wages. Thus the PPP is consistent with a "CPP" (Con-
sumer Pays Principle). As shown below, residual pollution costs, after
meeting pollution abatement objectives set by public authorities, may con-
tinue to be borne by pollution victims. Thus the PPP as envisioned by the
OECD and the EC is also consistent with a "VPP" (Victim Pays Principle),
insofar as residual pollution exists. Because these three terms, PPP, CPP,
and VPP all have distributional connotations, it has been an easy but incor-
rect step to infer an equity or distributional basis to the PPP.
B. How Much Should the Polluter "Pay?"
The full answer depends in part on the pollution abatement instruments
employed by governments, such as mandated technology, emission stan-
dards, and pollution charges, to name a few, and is considered in detail
below. Here it is sufficient to note that 100% pollution abatement is sel-
dom warranted in economic theory and is rarely required by govern-
ments.' 5 In most situations the marginal costs of pollution abatement rise
and the marginal benefits of abatement fall as abatement is pursued. The
socially optimal level of pollution-that level that minimizes total social
costs of pollution control and pollution damages-leaves some residual
pollution. Government policies tend to reflect a rough balancing of abate-
ment costs and benefits, with absolute bans on pollution (100% pollution
abatement) the exception rather than the rule.
Under the PPP, should the polluter pay for residual environmental
damages, in addition to paying for pollution abatement to the socially
optimal or government mandated level? The early consensus was that
while the PPP does not prevent governments from forcing the polluter to
pay for residual damages, such policies were in no sense required under
the PPP. The foreword to the OECD's 1975 elaboration of the PPP con-
firms this. It states that the PPP is not a principle of compensation for
damages caused by pollution and that the PPP is not intended to fully
internalize the costs of pollution.' 6 Pezzey defines the more limited pay-
ment obligation, of paying for the appropriate or optimal pollution abate-
ment target, the Standard PPP, and the more expansive interpretation, that
the polluter also bears residual damage costs, the Extended PPP. He sug-
Env't Committee, 3 (1973) (hereinafter Implementation Note], reprinted in THE Poi.
LUTER-PAYS PRINCIPLE, supra note 2, at 15, 16, and in THE POLLurER-PYS PINCIPLE:
OECD ANALYsEs AND RECOMMENDATIONS 25, 26 (OECD Environment Directorate ed.,
1992) [hereinafter PRINCIPLE ANALYSES].
15. Pezzey makes a useful distinction between effluent and pollution. "Pollution is
defined as occurring whenever effluent causes a perceived loss in environmental
value.... .. " John Pezzey, Market Mechanisms of Pollution ControL" "Polluter Pays", Economic
and Practical Aspects, in SuSrAINABLE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT. PRINCIPLES AND
PRACnCE 190, 193 (R Kerry Turner ed., 1988) (emphasis in original). Effluent falling
short of environmental damage is rendered harmless by "assimilative capacity." Id.
16. Foreword to THE PoL.UTR PAYS PRINCIPLE, supra note 2, at 6.
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gests that the more limited interpretation-the Standard PPP-is the
accepted interpretation in the United Kingdom.'
7
Given its rather critical importance, one might have expected that the
OECD in two decades would have made a clear choice of interpretations.
This is not the case. In its latest pronouncement, the Environment Direc-
torate of the OECD notes that "A movement is underway to extend the
Polluter-Pays Principle to the cost of damage caused by pollution."18 The
OECD itself has contributed to this movement. Its 1991 recommendation
concerning the use of economic instruments calls for the "internalisation
of pollution prevention, control and damage costs," although this was not
made an explicit requirement for adherence to the PPP.19
The original interpretation of the PPP-the so called Standard PPP-
has been further muddied in the OECD's treatment of accidental pollu-
tion. 20 The OECD's position regarding the allocation of costs arising
from accidental pollution and its prevention is broadly consistent with the
PPP. The costs should be borne by the operator and not become a charge
on public funds. The rationale is clear: accident prevention is more effec-
tive if the polluter bears clean-up and rehabilitation costs. However,
unlike its earlier incarnation, the PPP as applied to accidental pollution
appears to be little influenced by a desire to minimize trade distortions.
With regard to accidental pollution, the OECD drew distinctions
between (a) measures for accidental pollution prevention taken prior to an
accident to prevent or mitigate damage, (b) measures for accidental pollu-
tion control taken after an accident to limit damage and to rehabilitate the
environment, and (c) compensation to victims of accidental pollution. The
1972 OECD Council Recommendation, 2 1 its annex, 22 and the relevant
note by the Secretariat 23 all state that in general the polluter is responsible
for the cost of both prevention and control measures. They do not, how-
ever, state that polluters should pay or compensate victims for damages
incurred. Even within the prevention and control measures categories,
the polluter or operator of the hazardous facility would not be obliged to
pay if the control measures required by the authorities were not "reason-
able," the cause of the accident rested not with the operator but with some
other person or persons, or the accident were the result of a natural disas-
17. Pezzey, supra note 15, at 208-09.
18. Foreword to P~iNciPLE ANA.YvsES, supra note 14, at 6, 1 1.3.
19. Recommendation of the Council on the Use of Economic Instruments in Environmental
Policy, OECD Doc. C(90)177(Final) (Jan. 31, 1991), reprinted in PRINCIPLE ANALYSES,
supra note 14, at 49 (emphasis added).
20. See Recommendation of the Council on the Application of the Polluter-Pays Principle to
Accidental Pollution, OECD Doc. C(89)99(Final) (July 7, 1989) [hereinafter Accidental
Pollution Recommendation], reprinted in PRINcIPLE ANA.YsES, supra note 14, at 19; Applica-
tion of the Polluter-Pays Principle to Accidental Pollution, OECD, Note by the Secretariat
(1989), reprinted in PINcIPLE ANALYSEs, supra note 14, at 33.
21. Guiding Principles, supra note 2.
22. Id. annex, repinted in THE POLLUTER PAYS PRINCIPLE, supra note 2, at 12.
23. Application of the Polluter-Pays Principle to Accidental Pollution, OECD, Note by the
Secretariat (1989), reprinted in PRINciPLE ANALYSEs, supra note 14, at 33.
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ter that the operator could not reasonably have foreseen. 24 Notice the
more legalistic approach to accidental pollution than was present in the
original PPP. There are also more formalized exemptions to the PPP for
both accidental and continuous pollution which are discussed in part II
below.
The three documents cited above simply do not consider compensa-
tion to victims of accidental pollution. 25 But a 1991 draft report by the
Secretariat, which has not been formally adopted, endorses the allocation
of the "cost of excessive pollution damage to the polluter."26 As might be
expected, the rationale is to place proper incentives for the polluter, to
avoid accidents. Incidentally, it may be rational to internalize prevention
and damage costs for accidental pollution, but it would not be for antici-
pated pollution. The government is unlikely to spell out, in advance, all
accidental pollution prevention measures that must be undertaken by the
firm. Facing incomplete requirements for prevention, and no obligation
to pay for restoration and damage costs should an accident occur, the firm
may behave in a reckless manner.
With ex post rehabilitation possibly being required of the polluter in
the case of accidental pollution and the 1991 admonition to internalize
damage costs, we may conclude that the original purity of the PPP with
respect to the inclusion of pollution abatement but the optional exclusion
of residual damage costs is being gradually lost.
This newer interpretation has implications for the GATr. The Stan-
dard PPP as a "no government subsidy" principle is reasonably objective
and relevant data on compliance are apt to be available. Technically, it
would be feasible to write the Standard PPP into the GATT, but the
Extended PPP is far more subjective-monetizing the value of residual
environmental damages and requiring polluters to pay this amount. Strict
adherence to the Extended PPP in a revised GATT" would lead to chaos. It
follows that the newer interpretation of the PPP would have to be dropped
before incorporation in the GAIT.
The issue of paying for residual damages and possibly "rent" for the
use of assimilative capacity has been further muddied by recent calls for
the "internalization of environmental costs." There is no efficiency or
trade justification for interpreting this term to mean that a firm must pay
for residual damages and rent. Costs are satisfactorily internalized at the
level of the firm if the firm pays for its abatement expenditures, and on
the margin its abatement costs equal its environmental damage costs. As
24. Accidental Pollution Recommendation, supra note 20, app. paras. 5-7, reprinted in
PRciPLE ANALYsis, supra note 14, at 19, 21.
25. These victims of accidental pollution are somewhat analogous to the victims of
residual pollution discussed earlier.
26. "Excessive pollution damage" is poorly defined but appears to be different than
the residual damages described earlier, apparently meaning damage costs borne by
accidental pollution victims. See Compensation for rictims of Accidental Pollution, OECD,
Report by the Secretariat, 1 8 (1991), reprinted in PRINCIPLE ANALYSES, supra note 14, at
39, 40.
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shown below, many government measures are consistent with this objec-
tive but do not require payment for residual damages and rent.
C. Which Instruments Are Compatible with the PPP?
Pollution abatement objectives can be achieved through a variety of policy
instruments. These range from command-and-control measures, such as
mandated technology and source-specific effluent and emission limits, to
economic instruments, such as pollution charges, distributive charges, pol-
lution abatement subsidy schemes, and tradeable permits. There is a large
body of literature on the economic efficiency, administrative practicality,
and distributional effects of alternative instruments. 27 We are interested
in a narrower question-which instruments are consistent with the ppp?
28
We further narrow the discussion by considering the apparent original
interpretation of the PPP, in which polluters are obliged to pay for pollu-
tion abatement expenditures to achieve "appropriate" levels of pollution
but are not necessarily obligated to pay for residual pollution damages.
Clearly, command-and-control type measures are consistent with the
PPP so long as they are not accompanied by government financial assist-
ance.2 9 They are not, however, always the most efficient measures. For
example, if government policy requires either low sulfur coal or scrubbers
in power generation plants and abstains from assisting in the financing,
the abatement costs are kept in the private sector. This meets the original
intent of the PPP-to nudge actual production costs closer to social pro-
duction costs and avoid a trade distortion arising from international differ-
ences in pollution abatement financing schemes. In similar fashion, a
pollution emission standard set in quantitative terms, with the utility free
to choose the least-cost method of achieving the standard, is in compli-
ance with the PPP, even if the standard does not minimize the overall cost
of reducing pollution, or put differently, does not equalize marginal
abatement costs among different emitters.
3 0
A pollution charge is set to bring about the pollution discharge level
at which the marginal social costs of pollution equal the marginal social
costs of abatement.3 1 At first glance, it is also consistent with the PPP.
27. See, e.g., Maureen Cropper & Wallace Oates, Environmental Economics: A Survey,
30J. EcoN. LrrRATultE 675 (1992).
28. For a thorough discussion, see Pezzey, supra note 15.
29. Generally accepted exceptions to the PPP as elaborated by the OECD and the
EC are considered in part II. Pezzey limits his examination to economic instruments.
See Pezzey, supra note 15.
30. SeeJudith Marquand & David R. Allen, A Note on Some Aspects of the "Polluter-Pays"
Principle and its Implementation, in THE POLLUTER PAYs PRINCIPLE, supra note 2, at 77, 78-
79, 8
(The Polluter-Pays Principle is an efficiency principle only in the sense that it
ensures that the discharger will seek out the least cost methods of controlling
the [quantity] of what he discharges.... But its implementation does not neces-
sarily result in the attainment of an economic optimum; it is not an efficiency
principle in this stronger sense.).
31. This is also called a "Pigouvian tax," named for Arthur Pigou, Professor of Polit-
ical Economy at Cambridge University from 1908 to 1944.
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The firm's marginal production costs would equal the marginal social
costs of production, or the marginal private and externality costs. At the
margin, pollution costs are internalized. Should all producers follow this
practice, trade distortions would be avoided.32 As Pezzey and much ear-
lier Marquand and Allen pointed out, however, firms facing a pollution
charge would also be obligated to pay the government and possibly the
victim for the residual damages. 3 In situations in which the environment
exhibits assimilative capacity, the firms would also pay an additional tax or
rent on the firm's use of that assimilative capacity.3 4 While neither are in
direct conflict with the PPP, which permits but does not make obligatory
polluter payment for residual damage, they do increase the financial bur-
den on the polluter. According to Pezzey, such charges are unlikely to be
introduced.
3 5
Are subsidies to reduce pollution consistent with the PPP? At first
glance, the obvious answer would be no. Indeed the PPP is said to be a
"no subsidy" principle.3 6 On second glance, however, one is not so sure.
Consider a subsidy paid to a firm for each unit by which the firm reduces
its pollution below a target level. Such a subsidy37 induces the firm to
reduce pollution up to the point where its marginal abatement costs,
either in reduced output and profits or in pollution abatement expendi-
tures, are just equal to the subsidy. The firm's opportunity cost for contin-
ued pollution is the subsidy forgone, whereas in the pollution charges
system its cost is the tax. Both, however, have the effect of increasing the
firm's marginal costs. In this sense, pollution costs are internalized to the
firm, and the PPP does not appear violaied. This led Beckerman to con-
clude that "[i] t is for this reason that the widespread view to the effect that
[pollution abatement subsidies] distort[ ] international trade and consti-
tute[ ] a subsidy to the output of the polluting product happens to be
mistaken, at least in the context of a static analysis."3 8
Pearce and Turner.provide the basis for a third glance. They note
that while both the tax and the subsidy will increase the firm's marginal
cost, the tax increases average costs while the subsidy decreases average
costs.39 In the long run, at the industry level, with free entry and exit, we
can therefore expect a tax to increase product price and reduce output,
32. This analysis assumes the absence of monopoly conditions and other second-
best problems.
33. Pezzey, supra note 15, at 204-06.
34. Assimilative capacity is the inherent ability of the environment to absorb wastes
and render them harmless up to some quantitative level.
35. Because Pezzey defines the Standard PPP to exclude charging the polluter for
residual damages, he finds pollution charges incompatible with the PPP. Pezzey, supra
note 15, at 209-10.
36. Marquand & Allen, supra note 30, at 77, 78, para. 4.
37. This subsidy could also be seen as a bribe to polluters encouraging them to
pollute less.
38. Wilfred Beckerman, The Polluter-Pays Principle: Interpretation and Principles of Appli-
cation, in THE PoLLuTEr PAYs PRiNciPLE, supra note 2, at 37, 44.
39. DAVID W. PEARcE & R. KERRY TuRNmR, EcoNoMics OF NATuRAL REsOURCES AND
THE ENVIRONMENT 108-09 (1990).
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whereas the subsidy may attract firms, reduce product price, increase out-
put, and increase pollution. For this reason, pollution abatement subsi-
dies should be considered inconsistent with the ppp.
40
In a distributive charges scheme, the government imposes an incen-
tive charge for pollution and returns the revenue as subsidies for further
pollution abatement. Is this mixed system consistent with the PPP?
Despite OECD's assertion that it is,4 1 the answer is not clear. In this dis-
tributive charges scheme, the pollution tax is less than the Pigouvian tax.
If set properly, it raises enough revenue that when returned in the form of
pollution abatement subsidies to the industry or to firms in other indus-
tries that pollute a common natural resource, itjust achieves the pollution
abatement objective of the Pigouvian tax and raises revenues equivalent to
the abatement subsidy. Firms with high cost abatement functions will be
taxed, while low abatement cost firms will be subsidized. It has therefore
been argued that financial transfers among firms should be viewed as the
purchase of a service, pollution abatement, by one group of firms, high
abatement cost firms, from another group of firms, low abatement cost
firms, and should not be considered a subsidy in violation of the PPP. 42
But when such a distributive charges scheme is coupled with a system of
discharge standards, as appears to have been the case in Europe in past
years, consistency with the PPP may break down. Specifically, some firms
fail to meet their discharge standards because the charges are set too low,
and other firms receive aid payments from the charges. Barde concludes
that, in this situation, the PPP is disregarded in that no firm meets its total
treatment costs. 43 These schemes may also involve joint waste treatment
facilities with the tax used to fund the facility rather than being returned
as subsidies. It becomes increasingly difficult to say whether marginal
abatement costs are internalized and the PPP respected.
Tradeable permits are a fourth economic instrument. The idea is
simple and, in principle, efficient. A maximum flow of pollution is estab-
lished in quantitative terms for an airshed or watershed, or possibly for
some larger area at the national or global level. This maximum pollution
level may be set at a theoretical optimum, at which the marginal abate-
ment costs are equal to marginal pollution damages, or at some level
deemed appropriate or acceptable. The maximum flow is divided into
units or permits, and the permit price is determined by market forces.4 4
Firms with high abatement costs are net buyers, firms with low abatement
40. A further problem with subsidies is their tendency to encourage new entrants
who threaten pollution to secure lucrative government subsidies.
41. OECD, POLLUTION CHARGES IN PRACTICE 15 (1980).
42. Jean-Phillipe Barde, An Examination of the Polluter-Pays Pinciple Based on Case
Studies, in THE POLLUTER PAYS PRINCIPLE, supra note 2, at 93, 108.
43. Id.
44. The original idea is credited to Dales. SeeJ.H. DALES, PoLLUrION, PROPERIYAiM
PmcEs (1968). Tradeable permits are a central feature of the U.S. 1990 Clean Air Act,
Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2468 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.S. (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1994)).
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costs are net sellers, and the abatement "burden" is allocated among pol-
luters in an efficient fashion.
Tradeable permits can come in at least two flavors. If auctioned or
sold by governments, they approach the pollution charges scheme. Firms
would then pay for abatement down to the level at which these marginal
abatement costs equal the permit price and also pay for the permits, cover-
ing at least residual environmental damage costs and perhaps some "rent."
Alternatively, permits may be distributed without charge. In that event,
polluters as a group would pay for abatement costs but not residual dam-
ages. The internal distribution of costs within the set of polluters would
depend on the initial distribution of the permits among them and on their
abatement cost functions.
Either flavor is compatible with the PPP. But auctioning quotas
increases the financial burden on the polluters as a group, as does the
pollution charges scheme, and would be less attractive to industry. Freely
distributed permits would be close to the Standard PPP as defined by Pez-
zey. Neither scheme would appear to introduce any trade or investment
distortion, nor would it be inconsistent with the GATT so long as foreign
investors received national treatment in the acquisition by grant gift or
purchase of the permits. Restricting access to permits to domestically
owned firms obviously would be discriminatory and distortive.
D. PPP and the User Pays Principle
The User Pays Principle (UPP) is the natural resources analogue to the
PPP. Whereas the PPP addresses the discharge of residuals into environ-
mental media, the UPP concerns itself with the appropriate pricing of nat-
ural resources. In practice, PPP and UPP are not very different. Both are
designed to improve efficiency in resource use by internalizing external
costs.
The OECD has endorsed the UPP for natural resource pricing, espe-
cially for water, forest, and land resources. It is, however, a more difficult
principle to operationalize. Under the PPP, governments abstain from
subsidizing pollutional abatement. Under the UPP, governments are sup-
posed to find social prices and charge users for the costs of using natural
resources. For renewable resources, these costs would include not only
the standard costs of extracting or delivering the resource, but any envi-
ronmental damage costs and possibly depletion costs. For nonrenewable
resources, the costs would include the costs imposed on future genera-
tions by using the resource today and having it unavailable in the future.
Placing defensible monetary tax values on such concepts as option values,
bequest values and existence values, and finding the appropriate discount
rate, is in general not possible. As a result, the UPP is at best a reminder
to governments not to neglect real costs in natural resource pricing. For
our purpose, the UPP might make incorporation of the PPP into the
GATT more difficult. If governments must refrain from subsidizing pollu-
tion abatement expenditures, why should they not be required to refrain
from providing subsidized inputs such as water or stumpage rights at less
Vol. 27
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than full user cost? Yet, who can say in objective terms what these costs
are? Should one country be permitted to challenge a second, through the
GAT, on its natural resource pricing policies? And yet, as explained
below, incorrect natural resource prices are apt to be a more serious prob-
lem than subsidies for pollution abatement. The issue turns on whether
the GATT is the appropriate mechanism for improving resource pricing
practices.
E. PPP, Rights, and Equity
Although the origin of the PPP is an efficiency principle, it has always
carried an element of equity. Many years ago, Ronald Coase disposed of
the notion that it is necessary for efficiency to award rights to victims in
pollution externalities. 45 Either a legal regime that awarded rights to pol-
lution victims or to polluters was sufficient to ensure efficiency in resource
allocation, so long as a market internalizing the externality could be estab-
lished. The two legal regimes, however, have very different distributional
consequences. Many observers feel that it is more fair and equitable to
hold polluters responsible for pollution abatement costs and, perhaps, for
residual damages as well. Thus the PPP has appeal on both efficiency and
equity grounds.
As mentioned earlier, the OECD's 1975 analysis of the PPP did
express some concern for equity. That analysis notes that the cost sharing
of pollution abatement calls for "equity as well as efficiency,"46 and further
notes that the PPP seems capable of meeting the dual requirements of
efficiency and equity.47 The EC has also made the same connection
between equity and efficiency.
48
Other authors, less steeped in the anti-trade distortion origins of the
PPP, explicitly include an equity argument for its adoption. For example,
Kirit Parikh, in considering international pollution problems, concludes
that
because of the inequality among countries, in international negotiations
and on dealing with the problem of the global commons developing coun-
tries should be well advised to insist on the extended PPP [charging pol-
luters for abatement and residual damages]. The costs of preserving global
commons are high and the developing countries should not have to pay
anything more than their just share.
49
45. Ronald Coase, The Problems of Sodal Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960).
46. The "Polluter-Pays" Principle and the InstrumentsforAllocatingEnvironmental Costs, in
THE POLLUTER PAYS PRINCIPLE, supra note 2, at 22, 25.
47. Id. ("The principle can thus be described as a rule of economic, juridical and
political good sense.").
48. Cost Allocation Recommendation, supra note 4, annex, 1 1, at 2 ("[Charging
polluters for pollution abatement] satisfies the criteria of effectiveness and equitable
practice.").
49. Kirit S. Parikh, PPP and UPP for Developing Countries: Merits, Drawbacks and
Feasibility 11 (unpublished manuscript, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development
Research) (on file with the Cornell International Law Journal).
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II. PPP in Practice
A full review of the implementation and practice of the PPP has not been
attempted. We restrict ourselves to a discussion of generally agreed excep-
tions to the PPP and some comments on the extent to which OECD mem-
bers have complied with the PPP.
A. Exceptions and Derogations to the PPP
From the outset, the OECD has recognized that rigid adherence to the
PPP in all circumstances might be counter-productive. Three such cir-
cumstances have been explicitly mentioned.50 First, the establishment of
new environmental protection measures might be accelerated if existing
pollution sources are given assistance in their transitional efforts.5 ' Some
government assistance may "buy" greater cooperation from polluters.
This is a political economy argument and may well have some merit. The
task is to limit transitional assistance to a reasonable amount and time
period.
Second, exceptions may be justified to avoid exacerbating regional
imbalance within a country, to avoid or ease adjustment costs to industry,
and especially to allow attrition over time to moderate labor adjustment
costs. 52 Slowing adjustment costs can have a valid economic efficiency
basis. If the choice is between government assistance or slowing the pace
of environmental protection measures, assistance may be the least cost
method of avoiding the real economic and social costs of abrupt output
and employment loss.
Finally, because of its "public good" character, research and develop-
ment expenditures on pollution abatement technology may require gov-
ernment assistance and thus provide a valid exception to the PPP.55
In recognition of these special circumstances, the OECD formalized
several exceptions in its 1974 recommendations on the implementation of
the ppp.5 4 At the same time, to prevent exceptions from becoming a
major loophole, the OECD recommended assistance be limited to (a)
industries, areas, and plants where severe difficulties would otherwise
occur, (b) well-defined transitional periods laid down in advance, and (c)
assistance that would not create significant distortions to international
trade and investment.
55
To assure compliance with the PPP, the OECD established proce-
dures for the notification by member countries of assistance measures as
well as for consultations among members should trade problems arise.55
50. Note on the Implementation of the Polluter-Pays Principle, OECD, 11 7-8, reprinted in
THE POLLUTER PAIS PRINCIPLE, supra note 2, at 15, 17.
51. Id. 7.
52. Id. 1 8.
53. Id.
54. Implementation Recommendation, supra note 3, reprinted in THE POLLUTER PAYS
PRINCIPLE, supra note 2, at 18, 19.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 20.
Vol, 27
1994 Testing the System
Although member notifications have been made, there is no record that
any consultations have been requested. The absence of requests for con-
sultations suggests that derogations have been infrequent, the trade conse-
quences of derogations have been unimportant, or members have little
confidence in OECD consultation procedures. It appears that the unim-
portant trade consequences of derogations is the most reasonable
explanation.
After having formally adopted the PPP in 1973, the EC also consid-
ered exceptions and derogations.5 7 Its approach generally follows that of
the OECD in permitting limited government assistance if "serious eco-
nomic disturbances" might otherwise result,58 or where such assistance
supports industrial, agricultural or regional-structural policy objectives.
5 9
Assistance for research and development is also permitted.60 The EC does
limit permissible assistance to existing plants, prohibiting assistance to new
facilities and to existing facilities that have been enlarged in order to
increase their production capacity.61 The EC also permits some govern-
ment financial assistance to local authorities for constructing and operat-
ing public waste treatment facilities, the costs of which may not be fully
covered by charges to polluters.
6 2
Formalized exceptions to the PPP are important if the GATT is to be
modified to make the PPP an explicit obligation on members. Thus far
both the OECD and the EC have taken a pragmatic approach. The appar-
ent lack of serious trade disputes arising from exceptions to the PPP sug-
gests that any revisions to GATT language should also include some
flexibility.
B. Compliance With the PPP
There is no systematic analysis of the extent to which OECD or EC mem-
bers have actually complied with the PPP. An earlier study by the author
noted that during the 1970s, the United States had six potential assistance
schemes or policies: (1) accelerated depreciation in the tax code, (2)
investment tax credits, (3) exemption from Federal tax through its indus-
trial development loan program, (4) subsidized small business loans for
pollution abatement, (5) federal grants for municipal waste treatment
plants, and (6) development assistance grants to states.63 The study con-
cluded that at that time only the industrial development loan program
involved substantial funds.64 In 1974, total industrial pollution abatement
facilities financed under the program was $3 billion, with an estimated
57. Cost Allocation Recommendation, supra note 4, annex, 11 6-7, at 3-4.
58. 1& 1 6(a).
59. IM I 6(b).
60. Id. I 7(c).
61. Id. I 6(a) & n.2.
62. Id. I 7(a).
63. Charles Pearson, Exceptions to the PPP and International Trade 15 (Sept.
1976) (report submitted to the OECD Environment Directorate) (on file with the Cor
nell International Law Journal).
64. Id.
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subsidy rate of twenty-three percent.65 Translated into pollution abate-
ment financing subsidies as a percentage value of all industry sales, the
subsidy component was estimated at 0.036% for 1975.66 For specific
industries, taking into account differences in pollution abatement capital
expenditures, the subsidy component of sales was still very modest: 0.20%
for electric utilities, 0.13% for nonferrous metals, and 0.11% for
petroleum.
6 7
The earlier study has not been updated, and either changes in pollu-
tion abatement expenditures or assistance schemes might alter the conclu-
sions. However, this does not appear likely. U.S. pollution abatement and
control expenditures by business as a percentage of GDP have stayed a
remarkably constant 1.0%-1.1% for the two decades 1972-1991.68 This
suggests that the subsidy component of pollution abatement expenditures
has remained a small fraction of one percent of sales.
The EC experience with the PPP is more difficult to evaluate. Barde
analyzed several European schemes as they existed in the early 1970s.
6 9
He noted that in some instances the control of the transitional period was
"hazy," and that in water management schemes the PPP was only partially
met, as "aid payments are an essential feature of present-day strategies.
'70
More recently Verbruggen and Jongma state that at present the EC pol-
luter-pays principle does not provide much "clarity."7 ' They note that
time and again grounds for exemption are put forward, including finan-
cial assistance for developing cleaner technologies and products, assist-
ance for catching up to Community standards, and assistance where
member states wish to go beyond general EC standards.7 2 Pezzey notes
that in the United Kingdom effluent treatment charges are not set at mar-
ginal treatment cost for reasons of "equity," and that in the Netherlands,
effluent treatment charges are set at rates equal to pollution charges on
direct discharges to the environment.73 While he notes that both schemes
may involve distortions from an economic optimum and hence by implica-
tion depart from the efficiency objective of the PPP, Pezzey does not com-
ment on the presence or absence of direct government assistance.
The author is unaware of any studies which examine compliance with
the PPP in Japan. A thorough study of the implementation of the PPP in
65. Id.
66. Id. at 18.
67. Id.
68. Calculated from U.S. Department of Commerce, SURVEY OF CURR.ENT BUSINESS,
June 1992, at 35, 35 and COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS, ECONOMIC REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT 357, Table B-7 (1993).
69. Barde, supra note 42.
70. Id. at 117.
71. Harmen Verbruggen & SaskiaJongma, Environmental and Trade Policies in the
Netherlands and the European Communities 9 (1993) (draft, Institute for Environmen-
tal Studies, Vrije Universiteit, Netherlands) (on file with the Come/! International Law
JournaO). They note that financial assistance for the establishment of Dutch manure
treatment factories has been challenged. I&
72. Id.
73. Pezzey, supra note 15, at 231.
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OECD members might be useful if changes in the GATT are to be seri-
ously considered, but such a study would surely be a tedious affair.
III. Splicing the PPP and GATT
At a high level of abstraction, there is broad consistency between the
GATI"s position on subsidies and the PPP. Both recognize the trade dis-
tortive potential of government subsidies and attempt to limit them. Both
have attempted to find pragmatic accommodations with real world com-
plexities, the PPP through its exceptions and the GATT through its elabo-
ration of non-actionable subsidies. Non-actionable subsidies are simply
financial subsidies permitted by the GATT. Both have an element of
equity or fairness-the PPP by the term itself and its popular interpreta-
tion, and the GATT more explicitly, with subsidies and their frequent com-
panion, dumping, long identified as "unfair trade practices." The
congruence is not perfect, however, and the PPP may represent the higher
standard.
There are three primary PPP-GATr questions. The first question is
whether the PPP sets a higher standard in limiting government financial
assistance than does the GATT, and, if so, whether it would be desirable to
bring GATT standards and practice up to PPP standards. The answer to
the first part of the question is not clear-PPP anti-subsidy prohibitions
are different, and they may or may not be stronger than the GATT's. As
described in the preceding section, the PPP prohibits government assist-
ance with some reasonably well-defined exceptions. The GATT and the
GATT Subsidies Code approach appears milder. In general terms, the
GATT prohibits export subsidies for non-primary products. 74 Export sub-
sidies for primary products are not prohibited,75 but they should not be
used in a fashion that gives the exporting country more than an "equita-
ble" share of world trade in that product.76 Domestic subsidies are permit-
ted, but if such a subsidy increases exports or reduces imports and results
in serious prejudice to the commercial interests of other countries, the
injured countries can request discussion of the possibility of limiting the
subsidy.77 Developing countries are granted greater latitude with respect
to subsidies.78 The 1979 GATT Subsidies Code elaborates on these basic
provisions in several ways: by refining the notion of "equitable" share of
world export trade,79 providing an illustrative list of export subsidies,
8 0
and listing certain types of subsidies that are "nonactionable" and for
which countervailing duties are not authorized.8 1 These "nonactionable"
subsidies include subsidies for the redeployment of industry to avoid con-
74. GATT, supra note 7, art. XVI, § 1.
75. d. § 3.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. art. XVIII.
79. The Subsidies Code, supra note 8, art. 10.2(a).
80. Id. annex.
81. Id. art. 11.
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gestion and environmental problems. Note that there is an injury test in
the GATT's countervailing duty provisions. This injury must be purely
commercial in the country challenging the subsidized imports and cannot
be construed to be environmental injury in the country providing the
"environmental subsidy."8 2
The new Uruguay Round Agreement, scheduled to go into effect in
1995, further relaxes GATT disciplines on pollution abatement subsidies.
One provision allows government assistance for the adaptation of existing
facilities to meet new environmental requirements, subject to certain limi-
tations.83 A second provision, in clarifying the subsidy concept, limits
GATT rules to government financial contributions.8 4 This makes it even
less likely that the GATT would ever find that lax government environ-
mental regulations constitute subsidies.
Thus it is clear that the PPP sets somewhat different and possibly
more stringent standards in prohibiting government subsidies than does
current GATT language and practice. Should the GATT be brought up to
PPP standards? It is hard to make the case. There is simply no evidence
that financial subsidies for pollution abatement are a significant distortion
to international trade and are not being adequately dealt with under cur-
rent GATT subsidy-countervailing duty provisions. Moreover, the GAIT
has evolved intricate rules and precedents dealing with government subsi-
dies that distort trade. While these rules may not be perfect, it would seem
unnecessary, disruptive, and counter-productive to create a special, more
stringent regime for pollution abatement financial subsidies. Indeed,
such a move would be quite contrary to the language of the Subsidies
Code and the Uruguay Round Agreement, both of which acknowledge a
need for some government assistance in implementing stronger environ-
mental policies.
A strong argument can be made that the attractive features of the
PPP-its contribution to economic and environmental efficiency and its
aura of fairness-should be extended beyond the OECD. Spliced into the
GAT, the PPP would be almost universal. Extension of the PPP to the
more advanced developing countries, to the transition economies of East-
ern Europe, and to the countries of the former Soviet Union, would be
highly desirable. But rather than rewriting the GATT in a dubious
attempt to bring it up to PPP standards, the more straightforward
approach would be to persuade these countries of the advantages of volun-
tary adherence to the PPP. Existing GAT subsidy rules would provide
backstopping in case one country or another chose to ignore the PPP and
grant significant, trade-distortive, government subsidies.
Finally, any attempt to meld the PPP into the GATT would have tech-
nical and practical problems. Which interpretation of the PPP should it
82. GATT, supra note 7, art. VI, § 2.
83. Agreement on Subsidies and CountervailingDuty Measures, GAIT Doc. MTN/FA/II-
13, art. 8.2(c) [hereinafter Agreement on SCM], in Uruguay Round, supra note 9. Assist-
ance is limited to 20% of adaptation costs. Id. art. 8.2(c) (ii).
84. Id. art. 1.1(a)(1).
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apply? Are distributive charges systems actually operated in a fashion that
constitutes a subsidy? How are the exceptions and derogations to be
spelled out? These problems are not insoluble and indeed are found on a
daily basis in the GATT's subsidies activities. But a question remains as to
whether it is desirable to superimpose these problems on the already diffi-
cult subsidy-countervailing duty issues in the GATT.
Having said this, there are three more technical aspects that need
mention and attention. First, it appears clear in the new Uruguay Round
Agreement that cumulative indirect taxes on inputs into production can
be rebated to exporters without risk of subsidy allegations and counter-
vailing duties (CVDs). This is known as the tax occult issue. If the indirect
taxes were to correct for an externality in the use of an input, such as a tax
on high sulfur fuel, the result of the rebate would be increased ineffi-
ciency, as the export price would understate the social production costs.
Second, under current GATT rules, indirect taxes on products, such as
export rebates and taxes on like imports, can be adjusted at the border,
but production taxes cannot. It follows that there is a bias toward using
inefficient product taxes to control production externalities. Third, the
GATT has not yet fully considered environmental subsidies that correct,
rather than create, a distortion. The GATT Subsidies Code does make
research and development (R&D) subsidies non-actionable in terms of
CVDs.8 5 The rationale is that the product of R&D-knowledge-is a pub-
lic good which requires public subsidy. Some environmental subsidies do
not reimburse firms for pollution abatement but try to limit environmen-
tal damages. These include subsidies to farmers for assisting in nature
conservation practices or forgoing tillage of erodible soils. It may be nec-
essary to exempt these "green subsidies" from normal GATT treatment. In
fact, the New Uruguay Round Agreement does have special provisions for
environmental programs in agriculture-basically, some government pay-
ments will become exempt from the general obligation to reduce domes-
tic support for agriculture,8 6 and the provisions regarding subsidies for
R&D should make government support for developing clean technologies
acceptable.87 Nevertheless, further reflection on distortion-creating ver-
sus distortion-correcting subsidies would be desirable.
The second major PPP-GATr question is what, if anything, should be
done if countries set artificially low environmental standards or fail to
enforce their standards in an effort to improve their international compet-
itive position. This is the so-called "pollution haven" issue. Such behavior
would create distortions in international trade, with export and import
competing firms receiving implicit environmental subsidies. This behav-
ior would violate the spirit of the PPP as polluters, and their foreign cus-
tomers in the case of exports, would not pay for their pollution.8 8 The
85. Id. art. 8.2(a).
86. Id. art. 5.1.
87. See Agreement on SCM, supra note 83, art. 8.2(a), (c).
88. The country would, of course, bear the cost of excessive environmental
damages.
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question is not new.89 It has most often been analyzed in a more unilat-
eral context-should a country impose import surcharges and export
rebates to equalize environmental control costs internationally? Trade
economists generally agree that there is no efficiency or equity grounds
for full equalization of environmental control costs so long as countries
differ with respect to assimilative capacity, income, tastes, and pollution
abatement cost functions. Indeed, such differences form the basis for
trade and are the source of gains from trade.
The answer is less clear, however, when one or more countries set
environmental standards below the level appropriate to their social and
economic conditions. The OECD has finessed this issue. Its interpreta-
tion of the PPP requires polluters to pay for abatement costs to ensure that
the environment is in an "acceptable" state but does not require bringing
pollution down to an optimum level of any type. The "acceptable state" is
to be decided by public authorities.90 The OECD goes further in discour-
aging border adjustments: "differences in environmental policies should
not lead to the introduction of compensating import levies or export
rebates.... Effective implementation of the guiding principles set forth
herewith will make it unnecessary and undesirable to resort to such
measures."
9 1
The OECD's position is in large measure pragmatic, and it reflects
the great difficulty in making an objective determination by one country
that the environmental policies of another country are inappropriate to the
second country. If permitted, unilaterally determined border adjustments
would be an open invitation for covert protectionist policy and some
degree of bullying in the international system. It would also raise the so-
called slippery slope issue-if countries have the right to countervail
against inadequate environmental protection in a second country on the
ground that there is a trade effect, we can anticipate parallel arguments
concerning other government policies, such as inadequate occupational
health and safety regulations, minimum wage structures, or health insur-
ance schemes. The GATT does of course permit restriction of products
made by prison labor.92
At present, countervailing against low environmental standards or
weak enforcement of standards would probably be found GATr-illegal.
This is even more certainly the case in the Uruguay Round Agreement.
Should the GATT be changed? There are three possible grounds for
change. First, countervailing duties might offset the trade distortion aris-
ing from the implicit subsidy. Second, countervailing duties might con-
tribute to the perception of equity or fairness in international trade.
89. Charles Pearson, Environmental Control Costs and Border Adjustments, 27 NAT'L
TAXJ. 599 (1974).
90. Implementation Note, supra note 14,1 2, reprinted in THE PoLLUTrrR PAYS PIUNCIPLE,
supra note 2, at 15, 15.
91. Guiding Principles, supra note 2, annex, 1 13, reprinted in THE POLLurER PAYs
PRIcNiPLE, supra note 2, at 11, 14.
92. GATT, supra note 7, art. XX(e).
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Third, countervailing duties might induce stronger environmental stan-
dards in the delinquent exporting country. These are the same arguments
supporting the general subsidy-countervailing duty provisions of the
GATrC.
Set against these possible gains are obvious counterarguments. These
include the three mentioned previously-difficulty in reaching an objec-
tive finding of inappropriate standards, an invitation to covert protection-
ism and bullying, and the slippery slope issue. Perhaps the most
persuasive counterargument is the absence of any empirical evidence that
pollution havens of the sort described above are common and have seri-
ous trade distortive consequences. Indeed, the empirical studies of the
trade-competitive impact of differences in environmental control costs
suggest that there has been little measurable effect, and in any event some
of the trade pattern changes may well reflect improvements in resource
allocation patterns.
93
The NAFTA experience suggests a possible compromise. While an
objective determination that one country's environmental standards are
inadequate to its needs is difficult to make, it may be possible to determine
whether a country is properly enforcing its environmental protection laws.
If not, a revised GAT might permit some form of countervailing duty or
trade sanction. This possibility is written into the environmental side
agreement to the NAFTA. 94 Whether this procedure could be generalized
to the GATT level without the institutional structure created in the
NAFTA in the form of the North American Commission on the Environ-
ment (NACE) is an open question.
There are two other approaches to the pollution haven issue that do
not involve modifying the GATT. First, one could contemplate interna-
tional negotiations to establish certain minimum international standards
for highly polluting activities, such as power generation or nonferrous
metal smelting. Indeed, the 1972 OECD Guiding Principles called for the
harmonization of environmental standards when there were no valid rea-
sons for differences.95 Funds channeled through the Global Environmen-
tal Facility (GEF) might be used as an inducement to enter the
agreements. 96 In principle, voluntary cooperative agreements are prefera-
ble to coercion through the GAIT.
Second, failure to adequately protect environmental resources in the
natural resource-based sectors is a very serious problem, especially but not
exclusively in developing countries. A revised GATT that dealt with the
narrow question of pollution havens would not address this issue. Greater
attention to improving environmental practices in agriculture, forestry,
93. SeeJudith M. Dean, Trade and the Environment: A Survey of the Literature in INTER.
NATIONAL TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 15 (Patrick Low ed., 1992).
94. Can.-Mex.-U.S.: North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation,
32 I.L.M. 1480 (1993).
95. GuidingPrinciples, supra note 2, annex, 1 8, reprinted in THE POLLUTER PAYS PR. -
ciLE, supra note 2, at 11, 13.
96. Id.
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and fishing would have a higher payoff than efforts to broaden the GAT's
countervailing duty provisions.
Another issue is whether the GATT could or should play a more cen-
tral role in managing transnational pollution and, if so, how that role
would relate to the PPP. This question raises a number of issues well
beyond the scope of this paper, including the appropriate use of trade
measures in international environmental agreements, the consistency of
such measures with the GATr, and the issue of limiting imports whose
production damages international environmental resources, an aspect of
the Production and Process Method (PPM) debate.
97
In a narrower context, we can ask whether insistence on the PPP
might be a vehicle for disciplining countries that fail to give adequate pro-
tection to global environmental resources. Put somewhat differently,
would the preceding analysis change if the offending country-the coun-
try that chooses low environmental standards-was engaged in transna-
tional pollution or damaging international environmental resources? At
an abstract level the temptation is to say yes. In such circumstances the
polluter is not paying for its international pollution damages. This is not a
failure of the Standard PPP because it is the inadequacy of the abatement
effort, and not the financing of abatement expenditure, that is at issue.
Could GAIT rules permit countries to pursue inadequate environ-
mental protection when the damages are domestic for the practical rea-
sons set out above but limit their ability to flout the PPP when the damage
is international in scope? Specifically, could we write a GATT rule that
allows countervailing duties against couhtries that create international
environmental damages? Such a rule is conceivable, but it would be
extraordinarily difficult to implement. For example, what if a country fails
to protect its wildlife or genetic resources and others claimed that this
causes worldwide amenity or scientific losses. Who would determine if the
claims were valid? How would the countervailing duties be calculated?
Who is to determine what is the appropriate effort for China or India in
controlling greenhouse warming, and hence whether countervailing
duties against these countries would be actionable, under a revised GATT?
The GAT, of course, has no expertise in environmental matters and is
unlikely to acquire it. To write GAT rules which require an evaluation of
national environmental policies seems a mistake.
Surely the preferable route is to seek international agreements
outside the GATT, perhaps through some new international environmen-
tal organization. Such agreements might include trade restrictions, as in
the case of the Montreal Protocol,98 although the consistency of such
trade measures with the GAIT would have to be resolved. But the better
approach is to induce countries through financial or perhaps technology
97. GATT does not permit import restrictions to be based on the manner in which
a product is produced, unless the production method affects the characteristics of the
product itself. This is known as the PPM question.
98. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987,
26 I.L.M. 1550 (entered in force Jan. 1, 1989).
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transfers to enter voluntarily into the agreements. The Global Environ-
mental Facility (GEF) has a role to play here.
In a sense, international financial inducements such as the GEF invert
the Polluter-Pays Principle-the polluter is paid not to pollute. But the
implied equity or morality of the PPP is ambiguous at the international
level. Countries receiving net benefits from environmental protection
efforts undertaken by others, and particularly poor countries, should, per-
haps, pay under a Beneficiary-Pays Principle (BPP). The PPP and the BPP
imply very different allocations of rights, but the equity and fairness con-
siderations do not always favor the PPP over the BPP internationally. In
any event, it would be wise to keep the GATT as much as possible from
becoming an enforcement agency for environmental arrangements.
Summary and Conclusions
Despite its ambiguities, the Polluter-Pays Principle has stood up surpris-
ingly well over the past two decades. It is sufficiently flexible to accommo-
date a range of interpretations, a variety of environmental protection
approaches, and reasonable derogations and exceptions. Indeed, it is con-
sistent with a Consumer-Pays Principle, a User-Pays Principle, and a Vic-
tim-Pays Principle, while maintaining its core meaning of no government
subsidies for pollution abatement. Most likely, the PPP has improved envi-
ronmental and economic efficiency with the OECD, helped avoid trade
distortions, and prevented trade disputes.
At the same time, the apparent move toward interpreting the PPP to
include payment for residual damages or indeed "rent" for assimilative
capacity has little economicjustification. In general, payment for residual
damages is not necessary for economic efficiency if, on the margin, envi-
ronmental damages are equal to abatement costs. Nor is such payment
necessary to avoid trade distortions. If one country were to allege infrac-
tion of the PPP because residual damages were not paid by a second and
ask for trade relief, the result would be trade chaos. The OECD should
adhere to its original interpretation that the PPP requires polluters to pay
for abatement but not necessarily for residual damages.
There is no evidence that derogations and exceptions have seriously
undermined the PPP. The evidence on compliance with the PPP in the
OECD is incomplete, but failure to comply does not appear to have led to
significant trade distortions or disputes.
The PPP may set a higher standard in limiting government subsidies
than does current GATT practice. Additionally, it would be very desirable
to extend the PPP beyond the OECD to the more advanced developing
countries and to the transition economies. It does not follow, however,
that the PPP should be written into the GATT. GATT rules already can
deal with the more egregious violations of the PPP. Moreover, writing the
PPP into the GATT formalizes, in a legalistic sense, a principle that needs
flexible interpretation. The better approach is to persuade non-OECD
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countries of the advantages of voluntarily adopting the PPP. Several coun-
tries are already exploring this step.
Broadening the interpretation of the PPP to include countries that
deliberately set environmental standards below their social optimum and
rewriting the GAIT to permit countervailing duties is a dubious proposi-
tion. Such a move would invite covert protection and unending trade dis-
putes. Besides, there is little evidence that such practices cause significant
trade distortions. Still, it might be possible to find objective evidence that
a country is grossly negligent in enforcing its environmental laws. If such
evidence were found, the case for GAIT-sanctioned countervailing duties
would be slightly strengthened. The principal attention, however, ought
to be focused on correcting price distortions in natural resource sectors.
The environmental and economic costs of market and government fail-
ures are much higher in these sectors. Over time, and outside the GAIT,
improved international cooperation in natural resource-based trade, and
perhaps in setting minimum pollution abatement standards, is likely to be
the more productive approach.
Nor does it appear promising to use a PPP-fortified GATT as the
enforcement machine for transnational and global environmental threats.
There are legitimate questions of the consistency between the GAIT and
international environmental agreements and of extending product stan-
dards in the PPM area which are -not addressed in this paper. But rigid
application of the PPP to international environmental protection may
have perverse equity consequences.
Still, some modest rescripting of the GAT is in order. Current
GAIT rules allow export rebates and corresponding import tariffs for
taxes on products but not taxes on production. This may encourage the
use of inefficient product taxes to control production pollution. Indirect
taxes on inputs can be rebated at the border for exports, and indeed prior
stage cumulative indirect taxes may be exempted on exports even when
not exempted on domestic sales so long as the inputs are "consumed in
the production of the exported product."9 9 It would appear that an
energy tax on petroleum as an input into steel production, for example,
could be rebated when the steel is exported. If this interpretation is cor-
rect, it is a major loophole in the PPP, as the export price of steel is less
than its social production costs. With an increasing use of product-specific
environmental taxes, the GAIT treatment of the tax occult issue conflicts
directly with the PPP and may need modification. 10 0
The GAIT makes little effort to accommodate subsidies whose pur-
pose is to offset a market failure economic distortion. It does make R&D
99. Agreement on SCM, supra note 83, annex II, 1 I(1). Apparently this does not hold
for inputs that are physically present in the exported product, including those that are
in a form different from when they entered this production process. Id. annex II,
H(3).
100. Note that in this case the environmental damage occurs in the country of pro-
duction and export and is very different from an environmental tax on the exported
product, wherein the damage is to the country of destination and consumption.
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subsidies, assistance to disadvantaged regions, and limited assistance in
meeting new environmental regulations, non-actionable. This reflects in
part the distortion-correcting role of certain types of subsidies. But there
may well be a rather large number of "green" subsidies whose purpose is
to correct distortions. For example, a subsidy to recycle, or a subsidy to
refrain from cultivating marginal soils, may be the easiest and most effi-
cient approach to improving environmental protection. It would be
unfortunate if strict subsidy rules and countervailing duty procedures
found these green subsidies to be in violation of the GATr.
Finally, there will be an increasing number of cases in which one
country or international funding institution provides material support for
environmental protection in another country. Whether we think of this as
bribery, extortion, or simply equity, it would again be unfortunate if such
international subsidies were found to be GATr-inconsistent.

